Michigan Law Review
Volume 75
Issue 5 Issues 5&6
1977

Reflections on Public Interest Directors
Alfred F. Conard
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Alfred F. Conard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol75/iss5/7

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

REFLECTIONS ON
PUBLIC INTEREST DIRECTORS
Alfred F. Conard*

I.

THE IDEA

The "public interest director" may not yet be an idea whose time
has come, but it is an idea that can no longer be ignored. The time
has come for responsible lawyers and other opinion leaders to know
why, and to what extent, they favor or oppose it.
The most noticed articulation of the idea is, no doubt, that of
Ralph Nader and his associates. The Nader group would require
that each director have responsibility for a particular area of concern,
such as employee welfare, consumer protection, and environmental
protection. 1 Before the Nader manifesto appeared, Christopher
Stone had advanced a more modest proposal whereby ten per cent
of a company's directors would be designated to represent the public
interest; in case of "demonstrated delinquency" in a particular area,
such as consumer or environmental protection, a "special interest"
director would be added for that area. 2 Still earlier, Cyril Moscow
had advocated that each registered corporation should have one "independent" director appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 3 All three proposals are directed to resolving the conflict
between societal interests and corporate behavior that has troubled
political and economic philosophers and has excited polemicists during the past half century. 4

* Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. A.B. 1932,
Grinnell College; LL.B. 1936, University of Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia
University.-E<l.
1. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 12S
(1976) [hereinafter cited as R. NADER]. A preliminary edition of the same work
was published in 197S under the title, CoNSTITUTIONALIZING THE CoRPORATION: THE
CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS.
The three interests mentioned here are by no means a complete list of those with
which Nader and Christopher Stone are concerned. Nader also specifically lists
shareholder rights, compliance with law, finances, purchasing and marketing, management efficiency, and planning and research. I refer only to employee, consumer,
and environmental interests partly for brevity and partly because these are the interests which seem to be most prominent among the concerns of all three proponents
of public-interest directors.
2. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SocIAL CoNTROL OF CoRPORATB
BEHAVIOR 1S2-83 (197S).
3. Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAw. 9, 11-12 (1972).
4. For more general advocacy of representation of public interests without much
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942

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:941

For a conservative or middle-of-the-road thinker, and even for
a liberal who values his objectivity; it is tempting to reject publicinterest director proposals out of hand because of the intemperate
denunciation of corporate management that accompanies some of
them. 5 The rhetoric of Nader and Stone implies, although it may
nowhere firmly assert, that corporate managers have been deliberately ripping off the public in a mad chase for exorbitant profits. 0
Careful observers are aware that many of the supposed sins against
employees, consumers and the environment are, in fact, committed
by enterprises that are clawing desperately for survival, managed by
executives who would gladly accommodate public interest if they
thought they could afford to.
But one does not need to believe that corporate profits are
exorbitant, nor that executives are monomaniacal profit-seekers, in
order to recognize that a majority of Americans are dissatisfied with
contemporary conditions of work, of consumption, and of living.
Their dissatisfactions are expressed in a torrent of labor laws, consumer product laws, and environmental laws. Since corporations
provide most of the work, most of the consumer goods, and a good
deal of the environmental deterioration, 7 they bear the brunt of reguspecification of the structure, see R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY
IN A Goon Soc1ETI 115-40 (1970); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule
of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 43-45 (E. Mason ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as CORPORATION].
General critiques of this order of ideas may be found in N. JACOBY, CORPORATE
POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILllY, 120-245 (1973); Blumberg, Reflections 011 Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of
Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547 (1973);
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections 011 the Rule
of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31-38 (1970).
For a discussion of concern with corporate power and the interests which it
serves, covering the last two centuries, see J. HURST, LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970). For a nineteenth century response to those concerns, see w. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM
(1891).
A general concern with the relation of corporate policies to societal objectives has
been explored by Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Tmstees?, 45 HARV.
L. REv. 1145 (1932); FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION (H. Kahn ed. 1973); A.S.
MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMER·
ICAN CONSTITUTION (1976). Polemic attacks on corporations' antisocial behavior include R. HEILBRONER, M. MINTZ, C. McCARTIIY, s. UNGER, K. VANDIVIER, s. FRIEDMAN & J. BOYD, IN THE NAME OF PROFIT (1972), and I. WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN,
INC. (1931).
5. See Jacoby, Federal Charters: A Flawed Case, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1977, at
12, col. 6; Birdzell, Book Review, 32 Bus. LAw. 317 (1976).
6. See R. NADER, supra note 1, at 15-74; C. STONE, supra note 2, at 1-110, In
contrast, Moscow, supra note 3, at 9, recognizes the same problems in more measured
terms.
7. See P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE ScoPE
OF CORPORATE POWER 16-37 (1975).
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latory legislation. The defenders of the modern corporation as well
as its enemies should, therefore, be concerned with finding better
ways to reconcile the conflicts between corporate and societal objectives. This essay explores one possible way.

II.

ALTERNATIVE ROADS TO THE MODIFICATION
OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

If corporate behavior is to be modified, there are more ways than
one to go about it. The institution of public interest directors must
be compared with other means of attaining the same ends.
The most prevalent way of modifying corporate behavior for
social ends is to legislate commands. The United States codes of
laws and regulations are replete with rules on price practices, wage
levels, safety devices, and emissions that exemplify this method. 8
A second method of modifying corporate behavior is to
strengthen the bargaining power of some of the people affected by
its operations. The National Labor Relations Act9 is a conspicuous
device for strengthening employees' bargaining power through
unions. 10 Another massive program for behavior modification
through the exercise of bargaining power is the regime of securities
regulation, which operates primarily by requiring disclosure of more
information in order to protect investors. 11 The voluminous rules
on labeling foods and drugs 12 and the requirement of list-price
8. Familiar examples are the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975); the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13,
13a, 13b, 21a (1970); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970)
(prevailing wages in U.S. procurement contracts); the Bacon-Davis Act, 40 U.S.C.
§§ 276a to 276a-5 (1970) (prevailing wages in U.S. construction); the Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970); Air Pollution Control Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1165a, 1251-1376 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
9. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
10. For an analysis of the effects of union bargaining power on corporate policies, see Chamberlain, The Corporation and the Trade Union, in CORPORATION,
supra note 4, at 122.
11. Regulation is primarily through the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and the Securities Ex.change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The acts will be cited herein as the "Securites
Act" and the "Exchange Act," respectively.
See Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 Bus.
LAw. 61 (1971); Butowsky, The Investment Company Act as "Consumer Legislation," 27 Bus. LAw. 71 (1971); LeBianc, Accounting as a Consumer Protector, 27
Bus. LAw. 75 (1971); Sommer, Random Thoughts on Disclosure as "Consumer" Protection, 27 Bus. LAW. 85 (1971).
12. Regulations for the enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
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tickets on new cars13 are further examples, adopted to increase the
bargaining power of consumers. Unfortunately, no one has found
a way to increase the bargaining power of the environment.
These well-known methods of behavior modification may be
characterized as "external." Less familiar to our thinking are the
"internal" methods of behavior modification, which work by molding
the values of corporate executives and directors. 14
One internal method of affecting corporate behavior is to make
the managers responsible to holders of the interests that society
wishes to protect. In the past, the only interests that society has so
chosen to protect have been those of shareholders. Nearly all business corporation laws give lip service to this objective by requiring
that directors be elected by shareholders, 15 and the Exchange Act
honors it by the elaborate pageantry of the proxy rules. 16 Although
these legislative designs can be easily nullified by resourceful counsel, 17 they are often allowed to operate as intended, 18 and they create
Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act are found in 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.700
(1977); General Labeling Provisions (Drugs), 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.19 (1977).
13. Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1233 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
14. Cf. R. DAHL, supra note 4, at 121. Dahl classifies controls as "internal"
(through the corporate structure), "governmental" (through positive rules of behavior), and "economic" (through market mechanisms).
15. iSee, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 36 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CoRP,
LAW § 703 (McKinney 1963). Under Delaware law, shareholders' power to elect
directors is not expressly stated, but it is implied by DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(d),
211 (b) (1974 & Supp. 1976).
16. Regulation 14A: Solicitation of Proxies [under the Exchange Act], 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-12, 240.14a-101 to 14a-103 (1977).
17. The shareholder voting requirement is most frequently nullified by restricting
the vote to a very small fraction of the shares. In the Green Giant Company, before its notorious reorganization, there were 44 shares of voting stock and 428,998
shares of nonvoting stock. See Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 669
(8th Cir. 1962). In the Ford Motor Company, before the Ford Foundation's public
sale of its shares, 88 per cent of the shares were nonvoting. J. LMNGSTON, THE
AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 147 (1963).
The proxy information requirements are nullified, at least in the largest corporations, by the fact that corporate executives are allowed to use company funds for the
solicitation of proxies which they will use to elect their own bosses. Insurgent shareholders have no access to corporate funds for the all-important election of directors.
See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(1970).
For a general examination of the nonoperation of the "statutory norm" of corporate governance, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRivATE
-PROPER1Y (1932); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF nm CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1976); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers
and Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969).
18. See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 40-44 (1969).
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an illusion of shareholder control even when they are functionally
inoperative. The public-interest-director proposals are designed to
harness this somewhat unreliable structure for the protection of interests of employees, consumers, environmentalists, and others.
A second internal method of influencing corporate behavior is
to indoctrinate corporate executives with a role conception that
places a higher value on interests other than profit maximization.
Most corporate decisions are irretrievably in the hands of the
hierarchy of decisionmakers that John Kenneth Galbraith has
dubbed "the technostructure." 19 These decisionmakers may have
already mingled the goal of profit maximization with goals of their
own choosing, such as perpetuating and aggrandizing the enterprise
and their respective departments within it. They could probably add
a solicitude for the interests of employees, consumers, and the environment without even being detected.
A socially oriented model of goals for enterprise managers was
advocated in 1973 by a committee of the Confederation of British
Industry, which declared:
A company should behave like a good citizen in business. The
law does not (and cannot) contain or prescribe the whole duty of a
citizen. A good citizen takes account of the interests of others
besides himself, and tries to exercise an informed and imaginative
ethical judgment in deciding what he should and should not do. This,
it is suggested, is how companies should seek to behave.
Within its own field of knowledge, skill, geographical concern and
financial capacity ( these are important limitations) a company has
the duty to be responsive to the movement of informed public opinion
as well as to the requirements of authority. A company should, as is
indeed the practice of the best companies, pay proper regard to the
environmental and social consequences of its business activities, and
should not sacrifice the safety or efficiency of goods and services in
the interests of expediency and competitiveness. In environmental
matters, it is usually the company that is the first to know of a
potential hazard or critical situation; it has a duty in such circumstances not only to take all possible remedial measures but also to
inform the responsible authorities. 20

In the United States, a leading academic analyst of business
management has declared:
In an economic world that lacks the automatic regulation which
the classical economists' concept of perfect competition was supposed
to provide, the business executive must try to reconcile a range of
partially conflicting goals-those of his stockholders, his workers,
19. J. GALBRAI'llI, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 79-83 (1967).
20. CoMPANY AFFAIRS COMM., CoNFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, THE RESPONSmILITIES OF THE BRmSH PUBLIC COMPANY 23 (1973).
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his customers, his colleagues and himself, not to mention some vague
conception of the public welfare as a whole. . . . In this welter of
conflicting claims, it is not much exaggeration to say that the business leader has to play at being God. 21

Similar views have been expressed occasionally by United States
business leaders, usually speaking in their individual capacities. 22
Various devices may be used to intensify directors' concern with
the public interest aspects of their enterprise. Proposals like Nader's
and Stone's may be useful means of affecting directors' scales of
values, even if they never have any impact on corporate structure.
Sensitivity would also be heightened by a requirement, as proposed
in France, that companies report on how they are satisfying the interests of employees, consumers, and the environmentalists (as well as
financial interests). 23 This would be quite different from the
present SEC requirement, which compels disclosure only of effects
of compliance with environmental rules upon the company's financial
position. 24 The most effective sensitizer at the present time is the
ever-impending threat of more rigorous regulation, which directors
may seek to head off by responding to the demands of various
sectors of the public.
If society has a choice between modifying corporate behavior by
external or by internal means, it ought surely to choose the latter.
When pressures are purely external, corporate managers may be presumed to comply with them as grudgingly as possible. Beverage
bottlers may obstruct throw-away prohibitions by lobbying against
legislation, obtaining injunctions against its enforcement, repurchasing containers at inconvenient times and places, and delaying or deceiving inspectors. Manufacturers may comply with antinoise rules
21. R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN 11:IE LARGE CoRPORATION xvi (rev. ed.
1961).
22. See R. BAUER, THE CoRPORATE SocIAL AUDIT iii, 3-8 (Social Science Frontiers No. 5, 1972); D. MACNAUGHTON, MANAGING SocIAL RESPONSIVENESS (1975)
(distributed by Prudential Insurance Company); BLUMBERG, supra note 7, at 4-6.
23. See the proposal for an annual company report on a "social balance sheet"
advanced in COMITE D'ETUDE POUR LA REFORME DE L'ENTREPRISE, LA REFORMS DB
L'ENTERPRISE 204 (1975); Le "bi/an social" dans /es rapports des societes cotees pour
1975, BULLETIN MENSUEL DE LA COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BoURSE, December
1976, at 7-8.
24. "The amendments adopted herewith will require as a part of the description
of an issuer's business, appropriate disclosure with respect to the material effects
which compliance with environmental laws and regulations may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the issuer and its subsidiaries."
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10116 and SEC Securities Act Release No.
5386 (April 20, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 12100, reprinted in [1974) 2 FED. SEC. L. REP,
(CCH) ,r 23,507A (1974).
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in ways that meet a statutory standard with the minimum permissible
benefit to workers.
Furthermore, external pressures imposed on resistant enterprises
may result in deadlocks that can cause immense losses to everyone
involved, as when wor~ers strike for higher wages or manufacturers
strike (by refusing to produce conforming products) against emission
standards. Such deadlocks may result from mistaken estimates by
one side or the other about what is technically or economically
feasible. Wage demands may push enterprises into bankruptcy instead of raising incomes, and emissions regulations may close down
paper mills and power plants, rather than achieving amelioration.
If, on the other hand, boards of directors would be so constituted
that they would spontaneously direct their efforts toward conferring
the maximum feasible benefits on employees, consumers and the environment, accommodation of conflicting goals might be achieved
after long study and debate, but without strikes, obstruction, deceit,
and litigation.
This is the dream of the advocates of public-interest directors.
The question to be considered is, to what extent is it achievable?

Ill.

REDEFINING DIRECTORS' DUTIES

If officers and directors are to give weight in their decisions to
the interests of employees, consumers and the environment, an essential preliminary task is to redefine their legal obligations. It
would be a cruel hoax to appoint directors with a mandate to sacrifice shareholders' interests in favor of those of consumers, and then
to hold them liable for damages because they have violated their duty
to the corporation. But this could occur if public interest directors
were appointed without changing the law of directors' duties.
Unfortunately, the reformers' writings have given little attention to
the solution of this problem. 25
Since company managers have seldom admitted sacrificing shareholders' interests to other considerations, courts have had little
occasion to modify ancient dogma on this subject. The leading case
is still that of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company,2& decided in 1919,
in which Henry Ford was admonished by the Supreme Court of
Michigan that his professed objectives of benefiting his employees
and consumers were a misconception of his duties. 27 Although the
25. The problem is explored in Rostow, To Whom and for What End ls Corporate Management Responsible?, in CORPORATION, supra note 4, at" 46.
26. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
27. 204 Mich. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
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court refrained from any fundamental interference with company
policies, it did so only because the judges suspected (with good
reason) that some long-term profit objectives lay behind the shortterm sacrifices. 28 Even so, the court ordered him to distribute $19
million of excess cash. 29
In later cases, judges have tolerated charitable gifts that were
implausibly rationalized as furthering corporate interests, but they
have not otherwise retreated from the doctrine that the duty of directors is to benefit the company investors. 3° Corporation laws have
been amended to permit charitable gifts in limited amounts, but they
still do not authorize charitable policies toward profitmaking. 81 If
directors were chosen for the express purpose of representing other
interests in corporate policies, they would find themselves caught in
a very uncomfortable crossfire between their legal duty to the corporation and the purpose of their election.
A simplistic solution to the difficulty would be to declare that
directors are bound to direct the company for the most desirable accommodation of interests of investors, employees, consumers and the
environment. To be fair, one should probably add some other interests not often mentioned by the reformers-those of creditors,
vendors, immediate customers (who are generally different from the
ultimate consumers),82 the national economy, and public order.
The only known experience with such a multipurpose mandate
is not illuminating. The German Corporation Law of 1937 commanded company officers to manage in the interests of the enterprise, the personnel, and the common wealth of the people and the
state. 33 This formulation was dropped without explanation in the
28. "We are not satisfied that the alleged motives of the directors, in so far as
they are reflected in the conduct of the business, menace the interests of shareholders." 204 Mich. at 508, 170 N.W. at 684.
Ford's reductions in price and in dividends, which he attributed to altruistic reasons, had the incidental effect of reducing the resources which his dividends provided
to the Dodge Brothers, who had begun to compete with him, thus making competition
more difficult. See L. SELTZER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 240 (1973).
29. 204 Mich. at 487, 510, 170 N.W. at 677, 685.
30. 39 CORNELL L.Q. 122 (1953).
31. See ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 4(m) (1974). For a tabulation of
states with similar provisions, see 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac:r ANN. § 1,
3.01-.02
(2d ed. 1971). A leading case under one such statute is A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
32. In basic industries like coal and steel, ultimate consumers such as railroad
and automobile passengers are far removed from producers. Even in consumer goods
industries, the consumers are usually separated from producers by one or two tiers
of distributors.
33. Law on Negotiable Share Companies (Gesetz uber Aktiengesellschaften und

,m
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law revision of 1965, which simply ordered managers to manage the
company. 34
A dual statement of objectives is contained in the proposed statute for "European companies" to be chartered by the European
Economic Community, which would command managers to "promote
the interests of the company and its personnel."35 This dual formula, like the simplistic solution proposed above, suggests some
puzzling problems about enforcement. Could employees sue to enjoin the officers from unduly favoring the company over the personnel, while shareholders would sue for the reverse bias? If this were
possible a whole series of management decisions might be thrust
upon the judges.
A possible solution to this difficulty is suggested by the proposal
of the British Conservative government, made shortly before its displacement by the Labour Party, that "companies should consider
adding to their memoranda a clause allowing directors to take wider
considerations into account."36 This kind of an authorization would
permit managers to justify action that favored employees or consumers, without creating a basis for complaint if they did not. The only
misconduct that courts could redress would be directors' actions
favoring the directors themselves or negligent actions favoring no
one.
A statute drafted along these lines would be a radical departure
from current legal doctrine in the United States, but it would
probably make little difference in the decisions of cases. Practically
all the cases in which courts interfere with management decisions
are those in which the managers have favored themselves or a controlling group. The formulation would correspond to the public
pronouncements of many corporate leaders, who proclaim their
beneficence toward their employees and the public. 37
Kommanditgesellschaften au/ Aktien) of Jan. 30, 1937, [19371 Reicbsgesetzblatt
[RGBI] § 70,588 (Ger.). The closing words of the formula-Volk und Reichwere bywords of the National Socialist movement.
34. Law on Negotiable Share Companies (Aktiengesetz) of Sept. 6, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I, pt. 2 [BGB Ill]§§ 76(1), 93(1) (1965) (W. Ger.).
35. Statute for European Companies (1975), art. 70(1), BULL. EUR. CoMM...
(Supp. 4/75), at 41. The statute is designed to permit the formation of corporations
within the European Economic Community which would be subject only to rules of
the Community, rather than those of any one member state. See Vagts & Welde,
The Societa Europaea: A Future Option to U.S. Corporations?, 29 Bus. LAw. 823
(1974).
36. DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW REFORM 19-20 (1973)
(emphasis added). The report ascribed the proposal to the "Watkinson Committee"
report, but it is not clear that the report intended to be merely permissive about
broader responsibilities. See COMPANY AFFAIRS CoMM., supra note 20, at 9.
37. See R. BAUER, supra note 22; D. MACNAUGlITON, supra note 22.
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THE DIFFICULTIES OF MULTIPURPOSE MANAGEMENT

To most executives, the vision of a board of directors composed
of advocates of competing objectives would be a nightmare. Even
when all the board members are devoted to the single object of maximizing corporate profits, there are problems enough in reaching
prompt decisions and following consistent policies. The thought of
directors with different and conflicting objectives evokes memories
of the coalition governments of the German Weimar Republic and
the French Third Republic.
This nightmare might well become a reality if multipurpose
directors attempted to follow the traditional statutory norm which
states that "the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
by a board of directors." 38 But this precept has never been taken
seriously. Corporations have often employed the statutory option of
delegating many areas of decisionmaking to executive committees.80
Even when they did not, the important decisions were usually made
by executives and ritualistically ratified by the full board. 40 The precept itself has recently been modified by an amendment of the
Model Business Corporation Act to provide that the business shall
be managed "under the direction" of the board. 41
The delegation of management functions to executives and
executive committees may alleviate the problems of conflict in a multipurpose board, but probably would not eliminate the danger of
destructive conflict, because the delegation would always be revocable and subject to being overruled. A more complete system
38. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 35 (1969) contained this formulation
before its amendment in 1974 to prescribe management "under the direction of" the
board. 'See ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 35 (1974). Delaware General Corporation Law was similar before it was amended in• the same year. See DEL. CODE
tit. 8, § 141 (1974) (amended 1974).
39. Statutory authorization for the delegation is found, for example, in DEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 141(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §
42 (1974). On the use of executive committees, see C. BROWN, PUTTING TIIE CORPORATE BOARD To Woruc 66-69 (1976); THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND CoMMITTEES OF TIIE BOARD 50 (1973);
THE CoNFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION
AND LEGAL STATUS OF TIIE BOARD 109-17 (1973).
40. See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 11-13 (1972); R. GORDON,
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN TIIE LARGE CORJ?ORATION 116-46 (1961).
41. See note 38 supra. The Delaware amendments state that business shall be
managed "by or under the direction of" the board. DEL. CoDE tit. 8, § 141(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1976). For comment on the amendments, see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 1, 142 (2d ed. 1971); Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes
in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501 (1975); Arsht & Black,
Analysis of the 1974 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law, in 2 CORPORATION (P-H) 375, 376 (1974).
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for separating the function of management from the more deliberative function of supervision is the European two-tier system, which
divides corporate governance between a managing board of executives and a supervisory board of nonexecutives, including outsiders. 42
The supervisory board appoints the members of the managing board
but is forbidden to interfere in management functions. This system
was adopted by Germany in 1937,43 by France (as an optional variation) in 1966,44 and by The Netherlands in 1971.45 It is currently
contained in draft legislation of the European Economic Community
which, if adopted, would be mandatory for all nine members of the
community. 46 Although observers differ on the merits of the twotier system, 47 its growing list of adherents in Western Europe
indicates that it has won widespread approval among those who have
seen it in action.
A simpler method of separating management from supervision
has been suggested by Courtney Brown, who would merely remove
all or most of the executives from the board. 48 But this proposal
has the disadvantage of eliminating any requirement of group action
at the executive level. Probably there is merit in the concept of
shared executive responsibility, 49 as embodied in both the traditional
executive committees of American corporations and the "managing
boards" of the European systems. 50
If representatives of conflicting interests are to enter the governing structure of corporations, they should be restricted to supervisory
boards from which management functions have been separated. The
executives, constituting the executive committee or managing board,
would be chosen to work together as a team in running the company.
42. Vagts, The European !System, 27 Bus. LAW. 165 (1972); Schoenbaum &
Lieser, Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The "Two-Tier'
Board Model, 62 KY. L.J. 91 (1973).
43. RGBl §§ 70-99, BGB III§§ 76-116.
44. Law on Commercial Companies (Loi sur les societes commerciales) No. 66537 of July 24, 1966, arts. 118-150, in CCH, FRENCH LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIES 72 (1971).
45. Wetboek van Koophandel [W. v.K.] arts. 52c-52n (Neth.).
46. COMMISSION OF TIIE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A FIFTH DIRECTIVE ON THE STRUCTURE OF SoCIETES ANONYMES, (BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 10/
72) ). The directive would apply only to companies with freely negotiable shares,
and not to "close corporations."
41. See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 42; Schoenbaum & Lieser, supra note 42; Roth,

Supervision of Corporate Management: The "Outside" Director and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1369 (1973).
48. C. BROWN, supra note 39, at 32-33.
49. See M. MACE, supra note 40, at 13-27.
50. See R. GORDON, supra note 40, at 99-115.
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The representatives of conflicting interests would debate and compromise their differences in the relative isolation of an audit committee, a supervisory board, or a board of nonexecutive directors. The
omission of a provision for any such separation of functions appears
to be a major flaw in the proposals of Nader and Stone.
V.

THE PROBLEMS OF MULTIPURPOSE SUPERVISION

Even if the management function is separated from the board of
directors, there remain problems in effective supervision by a board
with diverse objectives. 51 To visualize the problem in its most acute
form, one may imagine a public health representative on the board
of a tobacco company, a wilderness representative on the board of
a lumber company, and a zero-growth advocate on the board of
a cement manufacturer. Although all these representatives have
legitimate concerns, they cannot be effective on the board of a company whose whole program they oppose. To the extent that they
are loyal to their own constituencies, they must favor the failure of
the enterprise rather than its success. On the rare occasions where
their interests coincide with those of other board members, their
voices will be distrusted because of their known hostility to the
objectives of the enterprise.
Although this problem inheres in all board memberships for
"public interest" purposes, its intensity varies greatly among the several constituencies that board members may represent. It is least
inherent in the representation of employees. In common with
investors, customers and consumers, employees stand to gain from
efficiency and economy in management, and they are uniquely
situated to apprise investors of executive inefficiency and executive
self-serving. In common with investors and with managers as well
(although not with customers and consumers), employees have an
interest in maximizing the prices obtained for products, not only for
the present but also for the long-term future. Finally, in common
with managers, they have an interest in the continuation of the enterprise, in contrast to speculative investors who may favor a stripping
operation; giving employees a few seats on the board might be an
effective way of dealing with corporate "raiders."
This view of employee interests may appear inconsistent with the
stance frequently taken by labor union leaders. But the apparent
hostility of labor leaders to enterprise prosperity is partly, at least,
a product of the warlike charade characteristic of the "collective bar51. See N.

JACOBY,

supra note 4, at 173-74.
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gaining" process, in which workers must be constantly inspired with
enough hostility to mount a strike in order to back up their bargaining representatives.
Employee representatives on a board might work very differently. As members of a board rather than bargaining agents, they
would find that their success would depend on their ability to persuade the representatives of investors that their interests converge,
instead of on their power to bring on a common disaster. Furthermore, each board would include representatives of the nonunionized
employees as well as of the unionized; if the German pattern were
followed, the white-collar employees would vote separately from the
blue-collar. 52 In The Netherlands, the "employee representatives"
are not elected directly by the employees but are co-opted by the
existing board, subject to rejection by votes of employees. The
German experience, covering a quarter of a century, indicates that
employee representation can work for the prosperity of enterprise,
or at least without adverse effect. 53
There is, of course, one area in which employee interests are
inherently contrary to those of other constituencies-not only investors, but also customers, consumers and others. Employees will want
more pay, and representatives of other interests will want to give
them less. But if employee representatives are less than a majority
of the full board, representatives of other interests can be relied on
to back up the managers' resistance to excessive labor demands.
52. Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of May 4, 1976, [1976] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I § 10, 1153 (W. Ger.). Furthermore, the representatives must
include representatives of white-collar employees and supervisory employees (foremen, managers and executives) as well as of blue-collar workers.
The distinction between Arbeiter and Angestellten, which are rendered here as
"white collar" and "blue collar'' employees, depends on a complex series of criteria
set forth in the German social insurance law. A German commentator says it is
chiefly a distinction between hand-workers and head-workers. H. MEILICKE & W.
MEILICKE, KOMMENTAR ZUM MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ 1976, at 62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MEILICKE].
In the enterprises which are still governed by the Enterprise Structure Law of
1952, the classes of workers are not required to vote separately, but the law requires
that the employee representatives include a white-collar worker. Enterprise Structure Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of Oct. 11, 1952, [1952] Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBl] I § 76(2), 681 (W. Ger.).
53. Blumberg, Goldston & Gibson, Corporate Social Responsibility Panel: The
Constituencies of the Corporation and the Role of the Institutional Investor, 28 Bus.
LAW. 177 (1973); Simitis, Workers' Participation in the Enterprise-Transcending
Company Law?, 38 MoD. L REV. 1, 9-10 (1975).
A multipartite commission to study codetermination, appointed by the West German Chancellor in 1966, reported in 1970. Their report, SACHVERSTANDIGENKOMMISSION, MITBESTIMMUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN (1970), contains a generally favorable
account of the operations of codetermination. Id. at 54-98. The report is known as
the "Biedenkopf Report," after its chairman.
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The coincidence of employee interests with the interests of other
enterprise constituents varies widely with the degree of employee
dependence on the enterprise. In an enterprise that consists of a
single retail store or restaurant, the individual salesman or waiter
does not need to be greatly concerned with the survival of the enterprise; he can work as well for whoever absorbs the business after
the enterprise fails. In contrast, the employees of General Motors
in Flint or of U.S. Steel in Gary would face catastrophic dislocations
if their employers collapsed. Among the factors that affect the degree of dependence, one of the most easily identified is the size of
the work force. There is therefore sense in the German rules that
invoke representation .only in corporations with a work force of 500
or more. 64
Another enterprise group whose interests are highly identified
with the prosperity of the enterprise are the customers-those who
buy its products or services. For a public utility-a railroad, an electric power company or a telephone company-the customers are also
the consumers. Because of the monopolistic character of these industries, their customers are intimately concerned with the prosperity
of the enterprise that serves them; the failure of Penn Central
menaced its shippers much more than its investors, most of whom
must have had well-diversified portfolios. Furthermore, the customers of a monopoly have very little ability to protect themselves
through the exercise of bargaining power.
The franchised distributors of automobiles bear a relation to
automobile manufacturers somewhat like that of customers to a public utility; they are deeply involved in the manufacturer's success, and
their interests concur with those of investors and employees except
in the price which they must pay for their purchases. Their representatives might be expected to work effectively with investor
representatives on a supervisory board. Like employees, they could
probably contribute unique perspectives in considering how well the
business is being run.
Ultimate consumers are usually several steps lower on the scale
of commonality of interests. The prosperity of any particular manufacturer is of little concern to them; their "customer loyalty" readily
54. This threshold was set by the Enterprise Structure Law of Oct. 11, 1952,
[1952] BGBl I 681. However, the provisions of this act were superseded as to enterprises with 2000 or more employees by the Codetermination Act of 1976, [1976]
BGBl I 1153. As a result, West Germany has one regime of employee participation
for enterprises with 500 to 2000 workers, and another more rigorous one for enterprises with 2000 or more. There is also a third regime for coal and steel enterprises,
which is ignored, for simplicity, in this discussion.
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gives way to offers of a larger rebate on a competing brand. The
likelihood that their representatives will contribute much to the joint
concerns of a multipurpose board of directors seems small. Even
so, their chances of effective cooperation with investors are probably
better than those of environmentalists.
Still further removed from the interests of the enterprise are
those persons concerned with the effect of the enterprise on the environment. The farmers who receive the fallout from Gary's blast
furnaces and Butte's copper smelters may have no interest in the
companies involved except to see them disappear.
VI.

THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES

Representation of the interests of employees, consumers and the
environment is not likely to achieve much unless the employees, the
consumers and the environmentalists actually believe that their interests are being effectively represented. If the representatives do not
have the confidence of their constituents, they will, not have much
influence on the representatives of other interests, and they will not
allay the frustration felt by those sectors of the public. The constituents are unlikely to place that confidence in their representatives unless they have some role in electing them.
Of all the public interest constituencies, the employees are the
best equipped to choose their own representatives. Their names
and addresses are accessible, and they have ready access to one
another. The two principal dangers to be avoided would be domination of representatives by the company's executives and domination
by labor union leaders. To guard against dominance by the executive, it would be sufficient to require the company to finance at a
reasonable level the nomination and campaign activies of employee
groups. To guard against dominance by labor leaders, it wou!d be
sufficient to divide the employees for voting purposes into categories
1
such as manual, clerical and supervisory, with each group having its
own representatives, and to forbid the use of union funds in
employee elections.
Selection of representatives by customers would present a more
varied set of problems. 55 It would be most practicable in power,
gas and telephone companies, where the customers' names and addresses and volume of business are already known to the companies.
In retail merchandising companies, on the other hand, voting by customers would hardly be feasible, even if such a selection process
55. See Ratner, supra note 4, at 32-33.
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were not, as previously indicated, of doubtful value because of the
lack of common interests between customers and other constituencies.
In contrast to employees and customers, ultimate consumers and
environmentalists seem to be inherently unsuitable as electorates.
Even the most outspoken advocates of their interests-such as Nader
and Stone-have refrained from proposing that they be given a role
in director selection.
Recognizing the difficulties of using public interest constituencies
as electorates, the principal advocates of public interest directors
have proposed other methods of selection. Nader would have them
elected by the shareholders;56 he would overcome their traditional
passivity by various provisions for minority nomination and by requiring institutional investors to pass voting powers through to their own
shareholders. 57 This plan seems to be misguided in at least two respects. First, it ignores the demonstrated fact that most investors
will not take the time to study issues in corporate elections, even
when they hold shares directly. When they have invested through
institutions, they have already made up their minds to delegate their
decisionmaking to others. Even if shareholders could be persuaded
to participate, they would be more likely to demand higher dividends
than to support social interests. Second, Nader ignores the fact that
no one would have any reason to regard the shareholders' choices
as reliable spokesmen for employees, consumers, or environmentalists.
The Stone and Moscow plans are somewhat more plausible, in
that both call for the major role in nomination to be played by independent organizations, including governmental commissions. 58 Their
proposals have the merit of assuring that the directors so chosen
would be independent of the executives, but they give no assurance
that these directors would be significantly closer to employees,
consumers and environmentalists. Whether they would effectively
serve public interests is an interesting speculation. Government
representatives sit on the boards of many British and Italian corpora56. R. NADER, supra note 1, at 126-28.
51. Id. at 126-30.
58. Stone proposes that public interest directors be appointed by a new Federal
Corporations Commission or, in its absence, by the SEC. C. STONE, supra note 2,
at 159. Moscow leaves election to the shareholders, but limits the nominees to those
approved by a new agency supervised by the SEC which would receive proposals
from such national organizations as the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, as well as bankers, lawyers, public accountants, university professors
and others. Moscow, supra note 3, at 12.
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tions and of the German Volkswagen corporation by reason of governmental ownership of shares. One may reasonably expect that
these directors, like ambassadors to foreign countries, would be
obeisant to their appointing agencies and would confine themselves
to repeating faithfully the pronouncements of their principals in the
District of Columbia. As a result, they might represent very poorly
the interests that they are designed to protect and would instead
merely supply jobs for a new bureaucracy. The SEC's reluctant implementation of the requirements of the Environmental Protection
Act warn against relying on governmental appointees to achieve
social objectives. 59
Whether these untoward consequences would eventuate cannot
be known without actual experience. Reasonable inferences could
be drawn from observation of experience with government representatives on boards in European countries. There is also a small
amount of experience available in the United States. Stone has
analyzed, with inconclusive results, the experiment with a United
States government director on the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 60 There have also been numerous government directors on
the boards of companies whose shares were seized as enemy property under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 61 but the present writer
is not aware of any analysis of the roles that these directors played. 62

vn.

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICABILITY

In considering how various structural revisions of corporate
governance might work in practice, I have passed over the question
whether political and legal forces would permit or preclude their
adoption in the United States. This question is left for another day,
partly to spare time and space, and partly because I believe that all
the ideas advanced in this essay will require long exposure to public
discussion before they will be suitable subjects for legislation.
For those who may wish to pursue further the development of
these ideas, I will point to two areas of difficulty that seem to merit
59. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689
(D.D.C. 1974).
60. C. SToNE, supra note 2, at 153-58.
61. -See Fallon, Enemy Business Enterprises and the Alien Property Custodian,
15 FORDHAM L. REv. 222 (1946), 16 FORDHAM L. REv. 55 (1947).
62. The writer was briefly associated with the Office of General Counsel for the
Alien Property Custodian (194571946), and is of the impression that government directors were principally concerned with assuring themselves that the companies were
being run for the purpose of profit rather than for the furtherance of enemy political
objectives.
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particular attention-the political and the constitutional. On the
political side, the main obstacle is the absence of any active desire
for the implementation of these ideas on the part of the most eligible
participants-employees and customers. With regard to employees,
there seems to be a basic rivalry between the internal system of
representation within the company structure and the system of collective bargaining. If internal representation should prove effective,
union officers would lose their role of leaders-in-battle, on which
much of their power and prestige depends. Consequently, union officers seem likely to oppose "codetermination," even if it would, in
the opinion of impartial observers, serve the best interests of
workers. Employees will be slow to perceive the conflict between
their own interests and those of their elected leaders.
With regard to customers, there does not seem to be any organizational obstacle to representation, but simply a lack of any strong
motivation to support it. The traditional defensive tactic of customers has been to seek legislative action; shippers have obtained railroad regulation, electric customers have obtained utility regulation,
and automobile dealers have obtained a degree of regulation over
manufacturers' treatment of distributors. Since the largest customers
have customers of their own, their executives are likely to hesitate
to espouse a principle that might undermine their own authority.
Turning to the constitutional problem, an interesting question is
presented regarding the constitutional basis for giving votes to new
voices among the corporate constituencies. The proposal is reminiscent of the Dartmouth College case, 63 in which the State of New
Hampshire attempted to place its own representatives on the board
of overseers of the college. The particular constitutional objection
that prevailed there-the prohibition on impairment of contracts 64would not stand in the way of federal legislation, 65 but obstacles
might be found in the .clauses on due process and on taking property
without compensation. 66 Perhaps the state would have to compensate shareholders for taking some part of their bundle of rights by
taking away a part of the voting power in the corporation. A similar
question was raised in Germany with the Codetermination Act of
1976, and various opinions on it were expressed both before and
63. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
65. The impairment-of-contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1, is a limita•
tion on the states, but not on Congress.
66. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
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after its enactment. 67 At this writing, the question has not been resolved by the West German Constitutional Court.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Putting together the pieces of the puzzle, we can draw some
plausible conclusions about various kinds of public interest directors.
Environmental interest directors are the least likely to be useful,
even to environmentalists. Since defenders of the environment have
few interests in common with representatives of investors, employees, customers, or consumers, they have little chance of making effective alliances with other constituencies. Having no constituency
within the ambit of corporate operations, they have nothing to trade
off. Although they might serve as gadflies, their energies would be
more productively spent in the political arena, where their influence
over voters gives them a position of greater strength. Their
presence on corporate boards may even be detrimental to the environmental cause, for such presence might nourish the supposition
that environmental interests are fairly weighed inside the corporation, which can never be true because of the weight of the interests
arrayed against them.
Consumer interest directors have a slightly better chance of operating effectively, because the other corporate constituencies-investors, employees, and customers-have a lively interest in consumer
favor. But there are two obstacles for which no solutions have been
suggested. One is the difficulty of finding the consumers and persuading them to concern themselves with their representation. The
other is that if the consumers speak their minds, their minds may
be devoid of any real concern for the prosperity and continuity of
the enterprise. The mind of the consumer is usually on the marketplace where he pays the price for the product. Consumer interests
are likely to be better served by improving their access to information, suppressing restraints on competition, and invoking criminal
laws against purveyors of dangerous or fraudulent products.
On the other hand, customer-interest directors and employeeinterest directors seem to be structurally practicable. In the giant
enterprises that are envisioned in all discussions of public interest
directors, it will usually be possible to identify and mobilize the constituencies involved. Both customers and employees have an inter61. See MEILICKE, supra note 52, at 44-47; T. RAISER, GRUNDGESETZ UND PARITATISCHE MITBESTIMMIUNG (1975); Meissel & Fogel, Co-Determination in Germany:
Labor's Participation in Ma11ageme11t, 9 INTL. LAW. 190 (1975).
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est in the long-term welfare of the enterprise even greater than that
of many shareholders, who can switch their loyalties as fast as they
can dial Merrill Lynch. Employees and customers are much less
likely than investors to display the apathy toward corporate affairs
that has turned shareholders' meetings into empty charades.
The danger in a system of governance shared by the representatives of employees, customers and investors is not so much that it
would not work as that it would work too well. The normal impulse
of investors to hold down wage costs and maximize sales might give
way to conspiracies to provide higher wages, more restricted outlets,
and higher profits, all at the expense of consumers. But this outcome seems no more likely to take place when employees and customers are represented in governance than when they are not. If
employees and customers were represented, the former would have
a chance to influence marketing in a direction that would maximize
employment, and the latter would have an opportunity to influence
wage policy in the direction of minimizing prices. The tendency of
these constituencies to balance one another would depend in large
part on the competitiveness of the industry. Representation of employees and customers might make rigorous competition even more
essential to public welfare than it is today.
The conclusions to which I am driven by these reflections may
be disappointing, but they are not without their positive aspects.
With respect to environmental interests, they reinforce the view of
leading environmental spokesmen that their influence on enterprises
must be exercised through the external pressures of regulations and
law suits. 68 A secondary line of defense must be education of public opinion to induce investors, employees, customers, and consumers
to use their votes and their bargaining power on behalf of environmental interests.
Consumer interests are also unlikely to get much help from direct
representation in the corporate structure. They must rely on a combination of government regulation with the power of consumers to
make choices in the open market. But consumers would probably
get some indirect help from the representation of customers and employees. Customer representation will benefit consumers when it
exerts its influence for a better product at a lower price. Employee
representation will benefit consumers when it reduces the wasteful
antagonism between employers and employees.
68. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 175-230 (1971); cf. Heyman, Quarles,
Sive & Cutler, The Challenge of Environmental Controls, 28 Bus. LAW. 9 (1973),
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Customers' interests, in contrast to consumers', could be effectively advanced through changes in the corporate structure, and the
consequences would probably be beneficial to ultimate consumers.
Employees' interests could very readily be advanced through corporate structure. Although use of this channel would probably not
result in higher wages than they can get by collective bargaining, it
might well operate to advance their welfare through more harmonious industrial relations. It could also benefit consumers and diminish the bitterness of the class struggle.
If none of these forms of public interest representation are put
into effect, it will not follow that the proposals have been in vain.
Although their proponents have failed to modify corporation behavior through structural change, they may modify it through the
second "internal method"-the reshaping of officers' and directors'
conceptions of their social roles. Probably all directors like to think
of themselves, in some degree, as actors in the public interest, and
the discussion of special directors for employees, consumers and environmentalists will make ordinary directors a little more cognizant
and considerate of nonprofit objectives.
More important than the effects of the public discussion of
multiple societal objectives on directors will be its effects on the role
conceptions of corporate executives. Regardless of who may be
directors, enterprises are increasingly under the control of the technicians who run them. This is partly because of the immense size of
enterprises, but even more because of the technical character of the
information on which decisions must be made. If public opinion
calls for a greater sensitivity to community interests, and even more
if it mumbles a threat to saddle executives with a new crew of militant public-interest overseers, executives will bring about decisions
that tend to mollify the advocates of these public interests.

